Why anyone’s argument for god(s) is fallacious,.... : Quote by Michael A. Wood Jr.

“ Why anyone’s argument for god(s) is fallacious, especially as a causal agent:Imagine Michael and Jessica are at Jimmy’s house sitting at the kitchen table. Jessica steps outside to take a phone call. When she returns her drink is spilled. Jessica asks, “How did my drink get knocked over?” Michael replies, “It was a SnickerDoodle.”J: “What’s a SnickerDoodle?”M: “It looks a little like an elephant but it is small, pink, and invisible.”J: “Is it invisible or pink? It can’t be both.”M: “Well, it is. You can’t understand what the SnickerDoodle looks like.”J: “Zip it. SnickerDoodle’s are not real. How did my drink get knocked over?”M: “Well, it was Jimmy’s cat, but it was because he was chasing the SnickerDoodle, so the SnickerDoodle made him do it.”J: “Stop with the SnickerDoodle, you weirdo.”M: “Just kidding, it was Jimmy’s cat, I don’t know why.”We have no reason to believe that SnickerDoodle’s are real. Without SnickerDoodles being established as possible causes to drinks being knocked down, then there is no point to discussing them as the cause of Jessica’s drink being knocked over. In similar fashion, we have to establish that cats are a possible reason that drinks get knocked down. Okay, we have established that cats are real and capable of doing so. It is now a viable option, but in order for Michael’s story have any plausibility, we not only have to establish that a cat did it, we have to establish that it was Jimmy’s cat, or that Jimmy even has a cat.Believers cannot get to step one, establishing that any god is even a viable option on the list of possibilities. Then even if gods were proven to be real, you still have to prove that it was your particular god, or that your particular god exists. To argue that your god is real, is like Michael arguing that Jimmy’s SnickerDoodle knocked over Jessica’s drink. Can grown-adults take that argument seriously? Really? ”

Michael A. Wood Jr.
  • From : Eliot
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